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Center for Terrorism Law to 
Host Special February Seminar 
Feb 14: Distinguished Speaker Series: The Cen-
ter for Terrorism Law presents Dr. Mohamad 
Chawki. Location: St Mary’s University Law 
Classroom 101, San Antonio TX. 8:30 am.  Dr. 
Chawki is arriving from Cairo, Egypt, to discuss 
cyber issues.  The event is free and open to the 
public. 
Feb 17: Terrorism Law and National Security.  
Professor Addicott will present a lecture at the 
FBI Academy.  Location: Quantico, Virginia. 
Feb 21: Rules of Engagement and Wounded 
Warrior. Location: St. Mary’s University, San 
Antonio, TX.   
March 3: 13th Annual Conference of the Texas 
Aggie Bar Association.  Professor Addicott will 
speak on Legal and Policy Issues in the War on 
Terror – 10 Years On.  Location: College Sta-
tion, TX. 1:45pm.  
March 14: Chafer Seminar Pastor’s Bible Con-
ference.  Professor Addicott will speak on Civil 
Liberty vs. Increased Security.  Location:  West 
Houston Bible Church, Houston, Texas.  
April 13: Alamo Chapter of Certified Fraud 
Examiners.  Professor Addicott will speak on 
Cyber Law.  Location:  UTSA Downtown Cam-
pus, San Antonio, Texas.  
May 2: Customs and Border Protection Confer-
ence, Advanced Attorney Training Seminar.  
Professor Addicott will speak on Terrorism Law 
and Border Protection Issues.  Location:  Crown 
Plaza Riverwalk, San Antonio, Texas.  
May 5: Robert Dilworth Chapter, Military Or-
der of the World Wars.  Professor Addicott will 
speak on Terrorism Law and the War on Terror.  
Location:  Georgetown, Texas. 
May 30-31: 3rd Annual Conference on Terror-
ism and Global Security: What Constitutes a 
Legal War in the 21st Century? An Analysis of 
the Role of the United Nations, NATO, and 
Coalitions in War Making in the Era of the War 
on Terror. Location: Washington D.C.  
Upcoming Events 
This material may not be published, or redistributed. ©2012 Center for Terrorism Law.  All rights Reserved  
The Center for Terrorism Law will host a one day conference to discuss two pressing issues in the continuing 
War on Terror.  The seminar is entitled:   Rules of Engagement and Wounded Warrior.  Leading subject 
matter experts from legal, industry, government, and military backgrounds will be participating.  Speakers will 
include Major General Alfred A. Valenzuela, U.S. Army (ret.); C. David Staffel, President & CEO, Aptus Tech-
nologies and former US Army Captain, Army Special Forces (Airborne); Mary Virginia Pittman-Walker, MVP’s 
Welcome Home-Wounded Warriors; Sergeant Joshua G. Primm, US Army (ret.); Captain Samuel B. Brown, 
U.S. Army (ret.), Commander Mark D. Waddell, US Navy, SEAL (ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery F. Ad-
dicott, U.S. Army (ret.) and Director, Center for Terrorism Law and Professor of Law, St Mary’s University 
School of Law. 
These distinguished speakers will be presenting detailed information on how self-imposed rules of engagement 
operate both in the realm of combat operations and non-combat operations regarding new technology innova-
tions.   In addition, Professor Addicott and Commander Waddell will discuss self-imposed rules of engagement 
using the case of Marine Lt. Joshua Waddell to illustrate how overly restrictive rules can lead to gross injustice 
to our troops in the field.  Currently, the Center is actively working with Marine Lt. Joshua Waddell (stationed 
in Afghanistan) to defend him against spurious accusations by his Company and Battalion Commanders that 
he committed violations of combat rules of engagement in the course of a combat operation. 
In turn, the seminar will also highlight the myriad of issues faced by our wounded warriors returning from 
combat.  The seminar will be held on February 21, 2012, in Conference Room A at St. Mary’s University, San 
Antonio, Texas.  Registration for the event will begin at 7:00 am and the program will start promptly at 8:30 
am.   The event is free and open to the public.  For more information about this seminar please contact: terror-
ismlaw@stmarytx.edu; or (210) 431-2219.  
7:00 to 8:30 am……………………………………………………………………………..Registration 
8:30 to 8:40 am…………………………..…………….………………………...Opening Remarks  
8:40 to 8:50 am……………………………..………………………………………...….Introduction 
8:50 to 9:45 am………………………..……….……..…………….Technology and Terrorism 
9:45 to 10:00 am……………..………………………………………………………………….……Break 
10:00 to 11:30 am….....……………..……Supporting Veterans of the “War on Terror” 
11:30 to 12:30 pm ……..……………………………………………………………………………. Lunch 
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war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress authorized the 
President to use.”  Then in Padilla v. Hanft, a Fourth Circuit opinion, another citizen’s 
detention was challenged and the court upheld the detention under Hamdi with no 
subsequent action from the Supreme Court to overturn either case. Therefore, current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence does allow the Executive to label United States citizens as 
enemy combatants, on United States soil or off, and hold them indefinitely, but only 
under an authorization by Congress. Since the NDAA is clearly an act of Congress, 
President Obama has the authority to detain American citizens indefinitely if he labels 
them enemy combatants.  
  
So why are some pundits in frenzy about Congress reaffirming what the Supreme Court 
has already determined eight years ago?  Obviously politics is at play.  The fact of the 
matter is that the president has seldom made public pronouncements about the legality of 
his war powers or openly endorsed the effect of the Hamdi decision in 2004. Coupled with 
the fact that 2012 is an election year (so was 2004) and it is easy to understand the lack of 
understanding. Regardless, the 2012 NDAA does not give the president any additional 
power he did not possess the moment before it became law because the AUMF is still in 
effect. Whatever the reasoning behind the NDAA, it is critically important for people to 
understand what the law is so that they can change it if they so choose.  
  
This discussion about the 2012 NDAA leads us to an interesting question not yet answered 
by the Supreme Court: can the Executive label a citizen an enemy combatant and hold 
him for an indefinite period on United States soil, relying merely on Article II powers, 
without an act of Congress? The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to reiterate that 
the Executive has the authority to detain citizens indefinitely under an act of Congress and 
has purposefully declined to answer the issue based on the president’s Article II powers 
alone. Although frustrating for those in the legal profession, this is not a new procedure 
for the Supreme Court as many decisions put off determining important issues, “for 
another day.” Although it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will take up this issue 
any time soon, new conflicts looming on the horizon might provide the perfect climate for 
such a case.  
Recently, many in the news media and 
political pundits on both sides of the 
aisle have been in an uproar over the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 
2012 (NDAA) signed into law by 
President Obama. The main criticism is that the law purports to 
give the president the authority to label United States citizens as 
enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely until the conflict 
ends. However, the president has held this authority for years 
since the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) passed by 
Congress and enacted by President Bush in the week following 
9/11.  So why the big fuss now?  
  
Although a plain reading of Subtitle D, Section 1021 of the 2012 
NDAA does not literally authorize the president to hold citizens 
indefinitely, similar language used in this new law has been 
interpreted that way by the Supreme Court in the past. Part of the 
NDAA states, “Congress affirms the authority of the President to 
use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force...includ[ing] the authority 
for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered 
persons pending disposition under the law of war.” A covered 
person is defined purposefully vague to give the president as much 
latitude as possible, “[a] person who was a part or substantially 
supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States...including any person who 
has committed a belligerent act….” It is important to understand 
that, “belligerent persons” (also called unlawful enemy 
combatants) has been used previously as a synonym for enemy 
combatants. The definition of, “covered persons,” is vague enough 
to include American citizens and, in fact, the Supreme Court has 
previously ruled that the president does have the undisputed 
power based on similar language used by Congress.  
  
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a 2004 Supreme Court case, cites the 
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) as the authority for 
the President to label United States citizens as enemy combatants, 
within the United States, and hold them indefinitely until the end 
of conflict under the law of war. The Hamdi Court concluded, 
“...that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we 
are considering for the duration of the particular conflict in which 
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
Recent CTL Publications 
Uproar Over the 2012 National Defense Authorization 
Act: Much Ado About Nothing New  
 
 
By  William A. Knight 
President Obama signing the National Defense Authorization Act. 
Professor Addicott’ s chapter on interrogation issues has been published in a book entitled: Contemporary Debates in Terrorism.  The 
book was recently published in January 2012 by Routledge Publishing Company and was edited by Professor Richard Jackson (Aberystwyth 
University) and Samuel Justin Sinclair (Harvard University) and is now available in both hardcover and paperback.   
In December 2011, Professor Addicott along with fellow editors MdJahid Hossain Bhuiyan and Tareq M.R. Chowdhury published a new book 
entitled: Globalization, International Law, and Human Rights.  The book analyzes human rights in the context of globalization and 
spans a variety of related themes.   
Professor Addicott also published an article in the January 2012, Managing Security Today entitled: Labeling Mexican Cartels as Terrorist 
Organization.   In the article Professor Addicott explores the possibility and the potential consequences of applying the terrorist label to 
the Mexican Cartels.  Addicott argues against such a label.  





Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 
2009.  The purpose of the bill was to enable the 
United States to work with various Central African 
governments towards a resolution of the conflict.   The 
bill also required Congress and the President to come 
up with a strategy to mitigate the threat posed by the 
LRA to the region.  As a result, four strategic objectives 
were created:  (1) the increased protection of civilians 
from LRA attacks; (2) the apprehension of Joseph Kony 
and other senior leaders; (3) the promotion of 
defections from the LRA and the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA 
combatants; and (4) the provision of humanitarian 
relief to LRA-affected communities. 
On the other hand, despite the media “spin,” the 
Obama announcement of sending Special Forces 
personnel into Africa is nothing new or novel.  For 
decades, U.S. Army Special Forces have regularly 
operated in scores of African nations conducting 
training and humanitarian missions.  Still, since the 
Obama announced deployment of additional U.S. Army 
Special Forces to Central Africa, there has not been any 
known retaliation from the LRA against civilians or 
human rights groups. 
Curiously, because of the public announcement of this 
particular deployment Congressional attention was 
aroused.  One of the main issues concerned the funding 
that has gone to the Central African region in efforts to 
protect the civilians and support the local government 
military to combat the LRA.  It is estimated that the 
U.S. provided over $34 million in aid to the LRA 
affected regions in 2010 and $18 million in 2011.   The 
State Department allocated over $41 million in the last 
three years for supplies through its Peacekeeping 
Operations account.  The initial Defense Department 
produced estimates that the current operation of 
additional Army Special Forces will cost approximately 
$4.5 million to operate each month.  Congress is also 
questioning the cooperation of the Uganda 
government, and the strategic objectives for the 
deployment of the additional Special Forces. 
Another concern with the U.S. involvement and 
strategy with Central Africa is the recent withdrawal of 
troops from Iraq and other countries that the U.S. is 
attempting to aid.  Questions also arise whether the 
U.S. is going to attempt a similar strategic plan with 
other foreign nations.  Further, what will actually 
happen if Joseph Kony is captured and killed?  There is 
no way to know that if he is eliminated, the reign of 
terror of the LRA will end.  What will happen if the LRA 
retaliates against the people of Central Africa?  Are the 
President and Congress prepared to take action if there 
is another massacre like in 2008?  As of the publication 
of this article, there is still no news whether the UPDF 
has been successful.  When the day comes, it will 
undoubtedly be an enormous relief to the people of 
Central Africa who have lived in fear of the LRA for 
over twenty-five years.  
On October 14, 2011, President 
Obama announced that 100 United 
States Special Forces were going to 
be deployed to Central Africa on 
what is described as an armed 
humanitarian mission.  The 
American support and training 
mission comes on the heels of an 
attempt by African forces to capture and end the nearly 
twenty-five year reign of terror of the notorious leader of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony.  It is not 
generally known that this terrorist organization has been 
waging a war against the government of Uganda.  In the fall 
2011 edition of the Center for Terrorism Law’s Quarterly 
Report, the Lord’s Resistance Army was featured as an 
active present day terrorist organization.  To date, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army has not received as much attention 
as radical Islamic terrorist organizations like al-Qa’eda, 
even though both groups employ similar uses of terror 
violence against civilians.  In November 2011, the media 
reported that President Obama gave the order to send 
Army Special Forces to Uganda to aid the military, known 
as the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF), as the 
UPDF tries to capture the LRA leader, Joseph Kony.  In the 
wake of this new directive some in the media shifted their 
focus to the war going on in Central Africa that has resulted 
in the deaths of thousands and displaced many more. 
The main issue for humanitarian organizations is the 
children that the LRA has abducted and forced to become 
solders or sex slaves for their army.  Horrific testimonies of 
the children who were fortunate to escape the LRA after 
being kidnapped revealed the daily atrocities they endured 
as a part of the terrorist organization.  According to the 
State Department’s report on October 14, 2011, entitled U.S. 
Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, the LRA has killed over 2,400 and abducted over 
3,400 people since 2008 alone. 
The international community has been minimally involved 
in combating this terrorist organization.  It was not until 
2005 that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued 
warrants for the five LRA commanders and Joseph Kony.  
Without a standing army, the ICC relies on the countries 
who are members to enforce the warrants.  After the 
warrants were issued, Kony attempted to negotiate with the 
ICC to have the warrants repealed.  Negotiations failed and 
the ICC has been unable to locate or negotiate with the 
LRA.  It is believed that there were brutal attacks in 
retaliation on the people of Central Africa by Kony due to 
his frustrations from the failed negotiations. 
In late 2008 the UPDF, with some logistical support from 
the United States, initiated Operation Lightning Thunder 
to capture or kill the leaders of the LRA, including Kony.  
The United States provided some equipment and 
intelligence to assist in the operation but no direct support.  
The operation failed.  In retaliation, the LRA conducted 
what is known as the Christmas day massacre where over 
865 civilians were murdered in Northern Congo and 
Southern Sudan.  It is believed that the operation failed due 
to a leak of information to the LRA leaders, which enabled 
them to separate and escape the military forces sent to find 
them.  Many human rights groups criticized the operation 
for poor planning and execution. 
The United States has been interested in combating the 
LRA since before 2008.  The LRA has been on the State 
Department’s Terrorist Exclusion list since 2001.  In May 
2010, Congress passed the Lord’s Resistance Army 
The Center for Terrorism Law will 
host Dr. Mohamad Chawki as part 
of our Distinguished Speaker 
Series on February 14th at 8:30 a.m. 
at St. Mary’s University School of 
Law, in Law Classroom 101.  Dr. 
Chawki will speak on cyber security 
and the current temperature in 
Egypt. This event is free and open 
to the public.  Mohamed Chawki 
holds a doctorate in law from the 
University of Lyon III in France for 
a dissertation on French, British, 
and American cybercrime legal 
systems. He is a senior judge at the 
Council of State; senior advisor to 
the Minister of Military production; 
Postdoctoral fellow at the 
University of Aix-Marseille III, 
France; and the Founder Chairman 
of the International Association of 
Cybercrime Prevention (AILCC) in 
Paris.  AILCC is an association of 
international IT experts and legal 
scholars specializing in cyber law, 
privacy and security.  He is also the 
founder and co – director of the 
African Center for Cyberlaw in 
Kampala (ACCP), founded in 
collaboration with the UN. 
Dr. Chawki has extensive 
knowledge of High Tec criminality, 
cybercrime, cyber terrorism and IT, 
including countermeasures and 
prevention.  As a part of his 
research, he carried out an 
internship at Interpol’s Financial 
and High Tec Crime Unit. He has 
also conducted legal analysis for the 
Organization of Cyber Angels in 
NYC and advised cybercrime 
victims on various issues related to 
countermeasures and prevention. 
Doctor Chawki is a Fellow of the 
Royal Society of Arts in the United 
Kingdom (FRSA); a member of the 
International Scientific and 
Professional Advisory Council of the 
United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Program 
(ISPAC); a member of the European 
Society of Criminal Law; and a 
board member of Computer Crime 
Research Center (CCRC) in Ukraine.  
He teaches law at private and public 
universities in Egypt and holds a 
number of visiting posts abroad.  
His research interests covers 
national security, cybercrime and 
data protection.  
The United States Sends Aid to Combat 
Central Africa Terrorist Organization 
CTL Welcomes 
Distinguished 
Scholar to St. 
Mary’s Campus 
By  Jenna Reblin 
“[T]he LRA has killed over 
2,400 and abducted of 3,400 
people since 2008.” alone.” 
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budget for 2013 trims approximately $6 billion from the 2012 base budget, lowering the 
purposed budget to $525 billion for the year, excluding the cost of the war in 
Afghanistan.  This proposed budget marks the second consecutive year that the defense 
budget has been rolled back, but the cuts were not unexpected and potentially could 
become much deeper under the terms of last summer’s deficit reduction deal unless 
Congress comes up with a new plan financed through either spending cuts or tax hikes.  
A simple enough solution until you consider what Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) pointed 
out on the Senate floor: “We have failed in our most basic responsibility for more than a 
1,000 days,” by failing to pass a Congressional Budget.  Sen. Cornyn argues that bringing 
a budget to the floor so that it can be debated and passed “is really sort of the only 
governing device you have to keep spending in check.” 
With no clear cut alternative in sight, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney sought to 
reassure the critics of the plan by insisting that, “We are at a turning point after a 
decade of war,” and new “challenges and opportunities” call for reshaping priorities.  
“The important part of this process is that the strategy come first and then reductions,” 
and that the reductions be driven by the strategy.  Carney continued to assure those at 
the press briefing about the cuts insisting that, “They're not random.”  Even so, the 
concerns over the new defense budget are not limited to the U.S.’s military readiness, as 
about a third of the current defense budget goes toward salaries, health care and 
retirement benefits, causing concern amongst many veterans going forward.  Despite 
Carney’s assurances, at some point the distinction between random and calculated cuts 
may be moot.  As the cuts become deeper the more severe the choice becomes between 
the aging veterans who have protected our freedoms in the past and the eighteen and 
twenty year-old soldiers in need of proper equipment to protect our freedoms in the 
present.  This kind of difficult decision is undoubtedly the type that elected officials are 
required to make, but in recent years have been eager to avoid.  The lack of a budget 
(stalled in the Senate) has robbed federal agencies, like the Pentagon, and the American 
people as a whole of a clear fiscal direction.  While on the Senate Floor, Senator Cornyn 
warned his colleagues, “The American people cannot afford for this body to keep giving 
mere lip services to fiscal sanity.”  As the various phases of the Administration’s new 
“budget-friendly” defense strategy goes into effect, the legislative branch will have 
ample opportunity to heed the Senator’s warning and make the tough decisions needed 
to provide the proper balance between the country’s budgetary and defense needs.  At 
the end of the day, America needs a strong military to protect our freedoms.   There will 
always be another war.  
During a news conference in 
January, President Obama and 
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta 
unveiled the administration’s new 
“budget-friendly” defense strategy.  
The unveiling came in the wake of 
American military withdrawal 
from Iraq and in the face of the continued threats from Iran 
regarding the Strait of Hormuz.  In part, the plan calls for a 
reduction in manpower with the Army going from 570,000 to 
490,000 active duty members, while the Marine Corps are 
expected to trim their ranks from 202,000 to roughly 182,000 
active duty members over the next decade. Additionally, under 
the plan the Navy will be retiring seven cruisers that lack ballistic 
missile defense capability or require significant maintenance in 
addition to delaying the current plan to build a number of next 
generation of submarines by two years.   
These and other cuts come as part of an attempt to eliminate 
roughly a trillion dollars from the Pentagon’s budget over the 
course of the next decade, and it is estimated that about half of 
the reductions will come from a decrease in defense spending.  
Obama’s Defense Secretary characterized the risk of the cuts as 
acceptable and basically asserted that the era of fighting large 
ground wars had ended - even as Iran continues to take jabs at 
the U.S. military by warning that it will no longer allow U.S. 
aircraft carriers through the Strait of Hormuz.  Some proponents 
of the plan have suggested that the plan allows for the Navy and 
Air Force to be strengthened without depleting the nation’s 
coffers, but many critics are not as optimistic, expressing 
concerns that the cut back will bolster the resolve of nations 
hostile to the United States.  In a January 2011 interview with Sara 
A. Carter of the Washington Examiner, Professor Jeffrey Addicott 
pointed to America’s past as a warning against the President’s 
new strategy: “After World War I we decimated our military 
while our enemies were building theirs,” he said.  “Before World 
War II we were practicing with broomsticks and plywood 
cutouts.” 
Even by shifting the focus away from the pressing concerns of 
military readiness towards the economic issues used to justify 
the Administration’s plan, enthusiasm for the plan is closely 
measured.  The Administration’s most recent proposed defense 
CTL Welcomes New Research Fellows 
Pentagon Budget Cuts Run Deeper Than Defense 
 
By  Anthony King 
During the fall of 2011, the Center for Terrorism Law announced the hiring of Fidel Esparza III, Anne Marie Hillis, Benjamin Marshall, Cyn-
thia Trevino, and Joshua D. Wilson as Research Fellows for the Center.  These fresh faces join Senior Research fellows Katherine Harmon 
and William Fix as well as veteran research fellows Susannah Cooper, Kj Harris, Anthony King, William A. Knight, Aida Montanaro, Jenna 
Reblin, and Julie Staffel. 
The Research Fellows are already hard at work to further the mission of the Center for Terrorism Law—examining current and potential 
legal issues related to terrorism in light of the challenge of achieving and maintaining a proper balance between global security and civil 
justice.  The Fellows’ duties range from the logistical operations of the Center for Terrorism law, to conducting research for a variety of 
legal projects. The Center and its Fellows are currently assisting with research projects on a variety of current issues, in addition to organiz-
ing and helping run events and symposia, writing articles, grant writing, updating book chapters, and keeping the activities of the Center 
up to date through the Quarterly Terrorism Law Report as well as the Centers website http://www.stmarytx.edu/ctl/index.php and over-
seeing the creation and launch of the upcoming online Terrorism Law Report due out later this spring.  
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin E. Dempsey 
“After World War I we decimated 
our military while our enemies 
were building theirs,”  
This material may not be published, or redistributed. ©2012 Center for Terrorism Law.  All rights Reserved 
By  Anthony King 
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New Research Fellows 
Article on my doing 2,000th 
media event with descriptions 
of some of the highlights and 
maybe   
stats on how many cable TV, 








Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 
____ (2010) is the most recent Supreme Court 
decision dealing with the continuing debate 
related to increased security vs. civil liberties 
in the War on Terror. Decided in June of this 
year, Holder entertained a variety of 
constitutional objections to key provisions of 
the Material Support Act (making it illegal to 
knowingly provide support to a State 
Department named terrorist organization).  
By a 6-3 vote the Court rejected the idea that 
the Material Support Act was 
unconstitutionally vague and that it required 
a specific intent as opposed to just knowledge 
of the identity of the terror organization.  The 
Court also rejected the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment argument and freedom of 
association argument.   
The Center for Terrorism Law is now looking for second year law stu-
dents to be research fellows 
Addicott’s 2000th Media 
Event 
A cyber attack can mean many things in our modern world.  It can describe anything from an 
electronic breach of a financial institution to a full-fledged cyber attack on one or more of our 
nation’s critical infrastructures. The greatest concern, of course, rests with protecting the critical 
infrastructures which include defense systems, water supply systems, transportation networks, 
banking systems, communication systems, etc.   
Not only should the general public be aware of the potential threat that a cyber attack would 
bring, but the associated legal issues also demand direct attention.  The Center for Terrorism Law 
recognizes the importance of keeping up with current developments regarding cyber security and 
the need to take proactive measures.  As such, a Cyber Security Legal Conference is being 
planned for February 2011 at St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas.  As the agenda comes 
together, the announcement of the conference will soon be made on our website, 
www.stmarytx.edu/ctl. 
Punishing Those Who Chase Booty: The Problems 
We Face Prosecuting Somali Pirates 
Until 1993, most Americans had no idea where 
Somalia was; much less could they have 
predicted what a foreign policy nightmare the 
small African country would become in the 
next decades.  People old enough to remember 
the 1993 United Nations intervention in 
Somalia most likely remember one particularly 
vivid image coming out of that country, that is, 
United States Army personnel being dragged through the streets 
of Mogadishu after being overrun and mutilated by militia loyal 
to warlord Mohammad Farrah Aidid.  President Clinton sent our 
special forces operators to the country to assist the UN mission 
of food delivery and to capture the warlord, or his lieutenants.  
After eighteen U.S. service men were killed and dozens more 
wounded, the Clinton Administration ended our involvement 
and withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia.  The UN forces soon 
followed in the exit and the country descended into the lawless 
State we see today. 
Fast forward 16 years to 2009 and we have Somali Pirates 
successfully hijacking the Maersk Alabama, which received the 
unfortunate distinction of being the first U.S. flagged merchant 
ship to be captured by pirates in 200 years.  The U.S. Navy ended 
the standoff with three simultaneous head hots by U.S. Navy 
SEAL snipers fired from the U.S.S. Bainbridge. 
Unfortunately for mer hants and t  navi s that protect them, 
there is no end in sight to the Somali piracy problem.  In 2008, 
the average ransom paid for the return of a merchant ship was 
between $1.5 and $1.8 million.  This potential payout is just too 
enticing to potential hijackers that have no marketable skills due 
to zero formal education and no other real opportunities for 
prosperity in the war torn 
country.  This has led to an 
increasing number of attacks 
over the last few years with a 
total of 237 last year alone. 
This is, of course, common 
knowledge.  What is uncommon 
knowledge, however, is the 
pains merchant nations have 
endured in attempting to 
prosecute Somali Pirates. 
The laws against piracy date 
back to the ancient Athenians 
and Romans with the Roman 
Cicero historically proclaiming 
pirates to be hostis humani 
generi, or enemies of all 
mankind.  Thus began the 
concept of universal jurisdiction 
with regards to piracy.  
Under the law of nations, any 
nation can capture a pirate 
and prosecute him on its own soil.  Practical concerns, however, dictate that 
U.S. policy, with a few exceptions, is not to try Somali Pirates in the U.S. 
court system. 
Imagine just how impractical the prosecution of Somali speaking individuals 
that are captured half a world away would be.  First, the Navy or Coast Guard 
would be forced to transport the individuals either by boat or by air to the 
U.S. for holding and arraignment.  This would require an extensive transport 
network from the east coast of Africa that is simply not feasible at present.  
The expense of initiating such a network would not be inconsequential.  
Either military transport or aircraft would need to be pulled from other 
duties to hold and transport prisoners or Navy and Coast Guard vessels 
would have to divert from their stations, or, more than likely, a combination  
By Joshua D. Wilson  
Continued on pg 6 
Seal Team Six Strikes Again 
 
Continued On Page 6 
“In 2008, the average ransom paid for 
the retur  of a m rc ant ship was be-
tween $1.5 and $1.8 illion.” 
Arguably the most elite Special Forces unit on the planet, Navy SEAL Team Six, has once again added to the rich history surrounding it by flawlessly com-
pleting another dangerous mission.  SEAL Team Six is considered a Tier-One “all black” counter-terrorism force. The group has never been officially 
acknowledged by the United States. 
  
On Monday, January 23, 2011, President Obama reportedly authorized the military plan for SEAL Team Six to infiltrate Somalia and free Jessica Buchanan 
and Poul Thisted, held hostage by pirates in that country. Jessica Buchanan was an aid worker in Africa and had a life threatening medical condition that 
likely spurred the rescue. President Obama told Defense Secretary Leon Panneta, “good job,” on his way to the Speaker’s podium before the State of the 
Union Address, presumably congratulating him on the successful SEAL mission completed mere hours earlier.  
  
The SEALs did not come from the sea but parachuted in high overhead from a C-130 Hercules aircraft during the dead of night, likely a HALO (High Alti-
tude-Low Opening) jump famously perfected U.S. Army Special Forces, and silently pproached the compound. Once one the ground the men stealthily 
breached the outer perimeter.  The SEALs eliminated nine heavily armed Somali pirates in short order.  After retrieving the hostages the SEALs departed 
with no injuries to the awaiting Black Hawk helicopters, which carried them safely to Djibouti. 
  
This recent mission could signal a shift in American foreign policy, which has mostly stayed out of Somalia since the 1991 helicopter crash that inspired the 
movie Black Hawk Down. The United States and many other major world powers have become increasingly more impatient with maritime piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden and around the Horn of Africa in general. As stated, one reason for the shift in U.S. for ign policy could be the 2009 pirate raid on the first 
American vessel, the cargo ship Maersk Alabama, in nearly 200 years. Whether the Obama Administration intends to exert more consistent American in-
fluence in the region remains to be seen.  Clearly, Obama did not take the opportunity to order a massive military attack against the dozens of pirate moth-
er ships or the large Somali ports where they operate.  If the problem is going to be solved in the long term, such military action may be the only solution.  
The Navy SEALs successfully killed bees around the beehive.  The real solution is to crush the beehive.  
By  William A. Knight 
The Maersk Alabama docked. 
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photographic evidence of the suspects handling 
weapons and chasing merchant vessels.  Time will 
tell just how effective this tactic will be. 
The method of choice so far for the U.S. has been to 
drop the pirate suspects off at the nearest willing 
nation that will accept them.  This differs markedly 
from the British and French methodologies.  Great 
Britain chooses to avoid the issue entirely to avoid 
any accusation of human rights infringement and 
the French choose to prosecute the suspects in 
Paris.  For the United States, the most willing 
country to take Somali pirates has been Kenya. 
After a May, 2011 decision by the Kenyan high court, 
the Kenyan lower courts have been exceedingly 
willing to accept pirate suspects in exchange for 
U.S. contributions to modernize the aging Kenyan 
court system.  So far, since 2006, hundreds of 
Somali pirate suspects have been dropped in Kenya.  
The Kenyans still, however, require evidence to 
prosecute the pirates effectively.  This results in the 
vast majority of suspects simply being released by 
the anti-pirate coalition and the suspects no doubt 
reenter the pirate force. 
Unfortunately at the present time, this is the best 
available means of prosecution for pirate suspects.  
Time will tell just how effective the Kenyan legal 
system will be at deterring future Somali individuals 
from taking up the pirate trade and how effective 
our drones will be at gathering the requisite 
evidence of piracy.  So for this year, the number of 
successful attempts have fallen due to military 
involvement.  However, as mentioned previously, 
total attempts are still on the rise.  This dichotomy 
is, in part, caused by a lack of options for the Somali 
men and only economic improvement in Somalia 
will prevent this problem.  For a region that has 
shown a regress into tribalism, and, for all intents 
and purposes, anarchy in a post European colonial 
environment, economic improvement is unlikely in 
the foreseeable future.  
of the two.  This is not what U.S. policymakers are 
willing to do currently. 
Once a pirate suspect would be transported to the 
U.S. for civil trial, a court would face its own 
logistical problems beginning with finding Somali 
translators willing to participate in a possibly 
lengthy trial and ending with finding room in our 
already crowded prison system for convicted 
pirates.  In addition to the logistics issues related 
to bringing pirate suspects to the U.S. for 
prosecution, procedural and evidentiary issues 
must be overcome as well. 
For example, until recently, no clear definition of 
“piracy” existed in U.S. or international law.  Both 
legal systems required a robbery on the high seas to 
take place in order to have “piracy.”  This issue 
prevented solid charges from being filed against the 
suspect as, in any instance where a navy vessel was on 
hand to capture the pirates, no robbery had taken 
place.  The U.S. code has been altered by Congress to 
alleviate this issue recently and it was not long before 
the new law was put to use. 
In the case of U.S.v Hasan, Somali pirates were tried 
and convicted for opening fire upon a suspected 
merchant vessel.  Unfortunately for the pirates, that 
vessel just so happened to be the U.S. Navy frigate 
U.S.S. Nicholas, which promptly returned fire and 
captured the pirates.  Naturally, when interrogated by 
the Navy, the suspects were simply “fishermen” that 
had assault rifles for protection against pirates. 
In the Hasan case, the evidentiary problem was easy.  
The suspects fired upon a Navy vessel and were 
captured with the weapons. The Navy also captured 
the pirate “mother ship” that launched the fast attack 
boat.  This is not the norm in the vast majority of 
cases.  The modus operendi of the pirate is to simply 
throw away his weapons when confronted by superior 
military forces.  With no guns in evidence, the men 
are not pirates but simply wayward Somali mariners.  
The Navy is attempting to bolster the defense against 
this by employing “Reaper” drones off the coast of 
Somalia.  A Reaper is a modified Predator drone that 
has been equipped for maritime missions.  The Reaper 
strategy is to watch the suspects from above and get 
Current Scholarly Projects 
The Center for Terrorism Law along 
with the Ambivium Institute on 
Security and Cooperation, will co-host 
the 3rd Annual Conference on 
Terrorism and Global Security.  The 
title for the conference is: What 
Constitutes a Legal War in the 21st 
Century? An Analysis of the Role of 
the United Nations, NATO, and 
Coalitions in War Making in the Era 
of the War on Terror. The two-day 
conference is scheduled to run from 
May 30-31, 2012 and will be held in 
Washington DC.  This international 
conference will explore the legal basis 
for the involvement of military force by 
other States in the War on Terror and 
various “wars” in the Middle East and 
Africa and related issues.   Among the 
topics to be considered:  Is the 
authority of the UN Security Council 
still functionally valid?  
Currently, the Center for Terrorism 
Law along with the Ambivium Institute 
on Security and Cooperation are 
soliciting members of the international 
community including: scholars, 
professional subject matter experts, 
military experts, and others to join us 
in exploring the full range of issues 
associated with the use of armed force 
to solve international conflicts.  
Related topics will undoubtedly range 
from history of war, targeted killings, 
law of armed conflict, human security, 
development, humanitarian 
intervention, and globalization.  Paper 
proposals for the conference are 
welcomed.  Proposals should be no 
more than 300 words and should 
include the author’s full name, title, 
and institutional affiliation and can be 
submitted 
at: 2012conference@ambivium.org.  
Registration fee for the conference will 
be $145.00 and will include a 
welcoming dinner, breakfasts, and 
lunches during the two-day event.  
Proposal Deadline: March 4, 2012; 
Notification: March 11, 2012 
Punishing Those Who Chase Booty (Cont.) 
 
3rd Annual Conference 
Terrorism and Global 
Security 
“So for this year, the number of suc-
cessful attempts have fallen due to 
military involvement.  However, as 
mentioned previously, total attempts 
are still on the rise.”   
The Center for Terrorism will be taking part in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues 2012 Symposium issue on Immigration.  Senior 
Research Fellow, Bill Fix, along with research fellows Kj Harris, and Aida Montanaro, have written an article entitled “Offense, Defense, or Just a Big 
Fence? Why Border Security is a Valid National Security Issue.”  The article addresses how border security is a national security issue for the United 
States.  Specifically, how drug cartels, cross-border violence, and human trafficking all contribute to border security problems and why the U.S. gov-
ernment must find workable solutions to these issues.   
Research Fellow Susannah Cooper has been working with fellow scholars at the FBI’s Terrorism Research and Analysis Project (TRAP), by preparing 
a chapter for the third TRAP book, which is expected to be published in December 2012.  Also Professor Addicott is writing a new law review article 
on domestic terrorism.  The extensive work will be finished sometime in the late 2012.  
This material may not be published, or redistributed. ©2012 Center for Terrorism Law.  All rights Reserved 
 7 
alleviate many of these difficulties.  In spite of this truth, the U.S. has 
done little to build its nonmilitary relationship with Iraq outside of the 
oil industry.  Through nonmilitary, diplomatic, and civil programs, the 
SFA was intended to bind the U.S. to Iraq, who should ideally be a 
strong, prosperous ally in coming years. 
Admittedly, the world will not likely see the results of such efforts for 
decades to come, and such long-term goals may be lost on shortsighted 
Iraqi leaders in a volatile domestic political condition.  Indeed, Iraq 
could very well spiral back into sectarian violence or suffer from Iranian 
influence.  Of course, policymakers are not likely to jump in 
wholeheartedly without the necessary assurances. Decisions concerning 
involvement with Iraq must be motivated by American interest in 
maintaining a certain amount of political leverage. In the end, the future 
of Iraq will be determined by their people’s ability to stabilize the 
domestic political framework.  They will have no further help from the 
American military.   
Obviously, combating political corruption can best be achieved through 
government transparency. Accordingly, the U.S. should condition any 
economic aid or diplomatic assistance on Iraqi leaders installing 
oversight and accountability measures. Such measures would not only 
benefit the United States’ interests, but would give the Iraqi people a 
level of confidence in their government they have yet to experience. 
In 2005, the Iraqi Strategic Review Board created a plan consistent with 
the SFA.  Titled the Iraqi National Development Strategy (NDS), this 
report includes initiatives to improve economic growth, lower 
unemployment, promote rural development, improve security, and 
support decentralization. By pursuing the objectives of the SFA, the U.S. 
will maintain political leverage and simultaneously fulfill Iraq’s 
purported ambitions. 
The future of Iraq is far from secure. U.S. interests in Iraq did not vanish 
in December of last year.  Iraq is still threatened by Iranian influence 
and the potential for all-out civil war.  The Bush goal of establishing a 
stable Iraq committed to democratic values has not been realized.  Now, 
with the Obama troop withdrawal America has only the power of the 
purse to influence Iraq.  Accomplishing the objectives established in the 
2008 Strategic Framework Agreement is still possible—“a long-term 
relationship in economic, diplomatic, and cultural fields will contribute 
to the strengthening and development of democracy in Iraq.” The 
question is whether it is probable.  
America’s goal for Iraq is set out in the Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA): “Building a 
prosperous, diversified, growing economy in 
Iraq… and the integration of Iraq into the 
international economy and its institutions.” 
Securing a long-term relationship of cooperation 
and friendship with Iraq is the ultimate end 
game, however aspirational it may be. Iraq 
initiated SFA talks with the Bush Administration in 2008 to ensure the 
U.S. commitment to a long-term strategy in Iraq.  The vision at that time 
was to negotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Iraq 
and the United States to allow for U.S. troops to remain in Iraq past 
December 2011.  This would ensure a greater period of stability for the 
new Iraq government. 
In October 2011, President Obama announced the decision that American 
forces would not remain in Iraq past the end of the year.  Although many 
in the Iraq leadership clearly desired a continued U.S. troop presence,  
Obama related that his Administration (Secretary of State Clinton) was 
not able to negotiate a new SOFA.  Accordingly, Obama ordered a 
massive withdrawal of almost 40,000 troops.  On December 16, 2011, a 
flag-lowering ceremony marked the official end to the Iraq War.   
The uncertain security conditions and power vacuum left behind raise 
doubts about the success of the mission in Iraq.  For better or worse, 
military action has been taken off the table and nonmilitary options 
appear to be the only available course for stability assistance.  Still, the 
Obama Administration has reaffirmed the U.S.’s commitment to the SFA 
and thousands of U.S. civilian contractors still remain in Iraq. 
Perception is reality. In order for the U.S. and Iraq to foster a long-
term, working relationship, the Iraqi people must see themselves as 
benefitting from further dealings with America and the West.  
Promoting and encouraging Western investment would add significant 
value to the Iraqi economy, and even their stressed political climate 
would benefit from diplomatic support, consulting services, and most 
importantly technology and knowledge transfers.  Facilitating greater 
freedom is the only real long-term solution. 
To illustrate, in 2008, Iraq’s state-owned car assembly plant entered into 
deals with European car manufacturers Scania, Mercedes-Benz, and 
Renault to assemble vehicles and manufacture parts in Iraq, injecting life 
into Iraq’s weak industrial sector. The Iraqi workforce is young, 
uneducated, and are in desperate need of training.  Privatization and 
investment through joint venture contracts with foreign firms can 
By Benjamin Marshall  
“The Iraqi workforce is young, uneducated, 
and are in desperate need of training.” 
“Decisions concerning involvement 
with Iraq must be motivated by Ameri-
can interest in maintaining a certain 
amount of political leverage.“ 
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New Research Fellows 
Article on my doing 2,000th 
media event with descriptions 
of some of the highlights and 
maybe   
stats on how many cable TV, 








Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 
____ (2010) is the most recent Supreme Court 
decision dealing with the continuing debate 
related to increased security vs. civil liberties 
in the War on Terror. Decided in June of this 
year, Holder entertained a variety of 
constitutional objections to key provisions of 
the Material Support Act (making it illegal to 
knowingly provide support to a State 
Department named terrorist organization).  
By a 6-3 vote the Court rejected the idea that 
the Material Support Act was 
unconstitutionally vague and that it required 
a specific intent as opposed to just knowledge 
of the identity of the terror organization.  The 
Court also rejected the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment argument and freedom of 
association argument.   
The Center for Terrorism Law is now looking for second year law stu-
dents to be research fellows 
Addicott’s 2000th Media 
Event 
A cyber attack can mean many things in our modern world.  It can describe anything from an 
electronic breach of a financial institution to a full-fledged cyber attack on one or more of our 
nation’s critical infrastructures. The greatest concern, of course, rests with protecting the critical 
infrastructures which include defense systems, water supply systems, transportation networks, 
banking systems, communication systems, etc.   
Not only should the general public be aware of the potential threat that a cyber attack would 
bring, but the associated legal issues also demand direct attention.  The Center for Terrorism Law 
recognizes the importance of keeping up with current developments regarding cyber security and 
the need to take proactive measures.  As such, a Cyber Security Legal Conference is being 
planned for February 2011 at St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas.  As the agenda comes 
together, the announcement of the conference will soon be made on our website, 
www.stmarytx.edu/ctl. 
The Situation is Dire in the Strait of Hormuz 
Since the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979, a long list of disputes 
has colored the relations 
between the United States and 
Iran.  The most prominent of 
the current disputes centers 
on the 112 mile long Strait of 
Hormuz (Strait). The Strait 
connects the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea 
and is the only possible route for oil to be 
transported from the Gulf States to global 
markets. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration has stated that oil transported 
through the Strait makes up 35% of all seaborne 
traded oil and that 20% of all oil traded must pass 
through this watercourse. 
  
The Iranian theocracy has always been known for 
“saber rattling” when discussing any issue 
involving disputes with the West, especially the 
U.S.  For example, in early January 2012, Iran 
threatened to attack the U.S.S. Stennis, an aircraft 
carrier, if it returned to the Gulf of Oman.  Most 
of th se threats are considered ‘empty’ and rarely 
acknowledged by the U.S.  In response to the 
threat against the U.S.S. Stennis, military 
spokesman stated, “the deployment of U.S. 
Milita y assets in t e Persian Gulf region will 
continue as it has for decades.”   
 
However, with Iran’s recent threat to close the 
Strait of Hormuz coupled with the current hostile 
political climate in the r gion, nalysts began to 
question if this was simply another empty threat 
and whether Iran was even capable of undertaking 
such a task. Gen.  Martin Dempsey, Chairman of 
the Joints Chi fs of Staff, on January 8, 2012 
answered, “The simple answer is: Yes, they can 
block it.”  Iran, knowing it cannot compete 
militarily with the U.S. 5th Fleet (5th Fleet), 
comprising of multiple Task Forces including 
carrier strike groups, amphibious and demining 
forces stationed in Bahrain, has invested heavily 
in its ability to close the Strait with three main 
asymmetrical warfare methods.  
  
The first of these methods details its ability to lay 
mines.  Iran possess s diffe ent platforms from 
which to lay mines, ranging from ships, 
submarines and helicopters coupled with 
experience to use them. Iran’s mine-warfare 
history includes the “Tanker War,” when it laid 
mines inside the Persian Gulf, resulting in damage 
to a U.S. Navy ship.  
  
Beyond its ability to mine the Strait, Iran’s second 
method includes possession of a sizeable arsenal 
of anti-ship cruise missiles, including authentic or 
copies of Chinese missiles.  Many of these are 
equipped on mobile platforms with the ability to 
evade detection, very similar to the Scud missiles 
used by Iraq in 1991.  
  
Iran’s third method includes a large arsenal of 
small fast attack boats that could be utilized to 
disrupt shipping in the Strait. Iran has 
demonstrated this method by utilizing these small boats 
in mock attacks on larger ships during war games. 
  
Aware of Iran’s capabilities, the U.S. has been 
vocal in responding to threats made by 
Iran. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton called the threats “provocative and 
dangerous.” She also emphasized the importance 
of communicating as clearly as possible with Iran 
in regards to provocations.  Officials from the 5th 
Fleet have repeatedly affirmed its willingness to 
defend commercial shipping and retaliate 
militarily against Iran if called upon and, “[a]
nyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of 
navigation in an international strait is clearly 
outside the community of nations; [and] any 
disruption will not be tolerated.” U.S. officials 
have also stated that Iran’s closure of the Strait 
would violate multiple international laws 
instituted to protect commercial shipping. Iran 
would also be violating numerous articles of the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
particularly Article 44 dictating States bordering 
straits are forbidden from h mperi  transit 
passage. 
  
Today, tensions surrounding Iran remain 
agitated, in part because of the otalitarian 
regime’s desire for nuclear weapons. The recent 
assassination of Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, Iran’s 
fifth highest ranking nuclear program engineer, 
and the latest round of sanctions imposed by the 
U.S. and other nations, have combined t  aise 
tensions in the region to levels not seen since the 
1979 hostage crisis.  Complicating relations 
further, Iran will be commencing its 
parliamentary election in March 2012 (the so-
called “free” elections offer only those candidates 
approved in advance by the religious ruling block).  
This could further the current policy of keeping 
the Strait open as disruption of crude transports 
could have dire consequences on Iran’s oil 
based economy, or could be filled with 
hardliners who are willing to take such extreme 
measures. The results of the election will be 
telling but expe t  xpect no “r form” 
candidates to be offered on the ballot.   
  
The latest sanctions from the European Union, 
banning the purchase of oil from Iran, are not 
slated to  take effect until this summer.  The  
reasoning behind this  was to allow  countries  
that are  in an economic crisis (e.g. Greece, 
Italy, and Spain) time to make arrangements to 
get oil supplies elsewhere. This grace period 
may not come into fruition as Emad Hosseini, spokesman 
for the Iranian parliament’s ene gy committee, stated 
lawmakers in Tehran were in the final stages of drafting a 
bill halting  all oil trade with Europe immediately.  
Although this may not be as strong a response as closing 
the Strait, if this legislation is passed it may have dire 
consequences to the European Union and perhaps the 
United States. Ultimately, th  long erm solu ion, for the 
United States is to exploit its own vast petroleum based 
resources and cease reliance on foreign oil.  
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